THE HISTORY OF THE BERRY HEAD FORTIFICATIONS
Written by: D Evans
Contents
Abbreviations
Abbreviations used in the notes
BH = Berry Head ( Official guide book.) Torbay, n.d.
BM = British Library, the British Museum
DRM = Devonshire Regimental Museum, Wyvern Barracks, Exeter
DRO = Devon Record Office ( Exeter )
PLY = Letter-books, Royal Engineer's Library, Brompton Barracks, Chatham
PRO = Public Record Office (Kew )
Introduction
Together with those of Maker Heights (now in Cornwall, but part of Devon then) the fortifications of Berry Head form the most impressive defences in the West Country to survive from the time of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Their purpose and function is possibly not apparent to the tens of thousands of visitors who come to the headland every year; in part because of the demolition at the end of the Napoleonic War of the temporary barrack blocks which had once filled the site, and of the disappearance of the sea ward-facing batteries which were their raison d'etre, but also because eighteenth-century fortifications are relatively unfamiliar to English people and their purpose not properly understood.
It may, for example, strike the visitor as odd that coast defence fortifications should face inland; yet in such a situation as Berry Head it would have been pointless erecting massive works on the sides facing the sea, as ships' guns of the time would have been unable to elevate their guns sufficiently to bear on the cliff top. Some protection against musketry was all that was required from that angle. The real threat to coast defence guns lay in their being captured by a raiding force which had been landed further down the coast, possibly unknown to the defenders, and the rear of such works therefore had to be strongly fortified.
The visitor may also wonder why two redoubts were constructed, and the knowledge that there was to have been a third might cause further puzzlement. The two redoubts (and the additional works proposed) in fact form a defensive system and are not to be considered as two separate small forts. The principal area to be defended was the tip of the headland, which contained the main barracks, store-rooms and magazine; the sole purpose of the other works was to defend this by presenting positions to an enemy which would have to be taken first. No eighteenth-century fort was expected to withstand a siege indefinitely; nothing, according to received opinion, was more certain than the result of a properly conducted siege.
The redoubts were constructed in response to the French invasion threats of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, and so represent a different, earlier type of solution of the coastal defence to the Martello towers familiar to visitors of the Kent and Sussex coasts. In order to see the Berry Head defences in their historical context some account of the defence arrangements made in Devonshire has been given here.[1]
The Board of Ordnance crops up frequently in the narrative which follows. A few words of explanation about this long-defunct Government department are in order here. It was constituted in 1597, at a time when there was no standing army or navy, forces being assembled when required on an ad hoc basis. Only the means of furnishing them with warlike stores needed to be established on a permanent basis. The Master-General of the Ordnance presided over a Board of four Principal Officers, who were individually answerable to the Master-General, there being no collective responsibility. Berry Head was the last fortification to be ordered during the Master-Generalship of the third Duke of Richmond: the design of the redoubts is partly due to him and the defensive scheme would have been much more elaborate if he had been able to initiate his projected alternative design before his fall from office in 1795.
The Board supplied both the Army and Navy, being subordinate to neither organisation. In 1683 the Board was reformed, and its duties increased. In addition to the issue of stores it now had to provide artillery and engineering trains, with the responsibilities for fortification this entailed. This caused a drastic change in the composition of the Board. The personnel were divided into Civil and Military sections, the members of the Board all being civilians originally. However, the great expansion of the Army during the early eighteenth century produced large permanent corps of Artillery and Engineers, and these began to be appointed to posts formerly held by civilians.
By the end of the Napoleonic Wars this process had ensured that the department was largely staffed by Army officers. It consequently began to appear as a duplicate of the War Office, and the situation was rationalised in 1855 (the search for a scapegoat for the failures of the Crimean War also playing its part) by the abolition of the Board, its duties being merged with those of the War Office.
Much of the information which survives about the Berry Head defences therefore naturally comes from the records of the Board of Ordnance. Another most valuable source, which occasionally duplicates the Board's documents, is the sequence of letter-books from the Royal Engineers' office at Plymouth, which preserves fair copies of (not all) the letters exchanged between its commanding officer and the Master-General and Board.
As the Berry Head defences were never called upon to perform in action (the World War 2 anti-aircraft batteries had nothing to do with the fortifications as such) their relatively uneventful history can be best told by the reasonably complete documentation of their construction and disposal.
Glossary
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ABBATIS |
An improvised obstacle consisting of felled trees, stripped of their leaves, placed with their branches pointing towards the enemy. |
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BARBETTE |
Guns are mounted en barbette when they fire directly over the parapet and not through an embrasure. |
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BASTION |
A projecting part of a fortification, consisting of an earthwork, faced with brick or stone, or of a mass of masonry, in the form of an irregular pentagon, having its base in the main line, or at an angle, of the fortification; its 'flanks' are the two sides which spring from the base, and are shorter than the 'faces' or two sides which meet in the acute 'salient angle'. |
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CAPONIER |
A defensive work which projects into or across the ditch and armed with musketry and carronades to sweep the ditch with fire. |
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CARRONADE |
A short muzzle-loading gun used in fortifications to fire grape-shot. |
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CASEMATE |
A vaulted masonry structure forming a bomb-proof housing for guns or barrack accommodation. |
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CORDOT |
A decorative roll moulding applied near the top of the revetments of an escarp. |
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COUNTERSCARP |
The outer wall of a ditch. |
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COUP DE MAIN |
A sudden violent attack for the purpose of instantly capturing a position. |
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COVERED WAY |
A path running round the top of the counterscarp which conceals troops placed there by a parapet. |
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CURTAIN |
The portion of the main wall which joins two bastions. |
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EMBRASURE |
An opening in the parapet for a gun to fire through. |
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ENFILADE |
Fire directed from the flank of a line in order to rake its length. |
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ESCARP |
The inner wall of a ditch. |
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FIELD WORK |
Fortifications improvised in the course of a campaign. |
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FRAIZE |
Palisades set horizontally at the top of the escarp as a further obstacle. |
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GALLERY |
Galleries can be placed in the revetted walls of the escarp or counterscarp and provided with loopholes. |
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GLACIS |
An artificially prepared slope leading up to the ditch: troops attacking the defences have to cross it, exposing themselves to the fire of the defenders. |
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GORGE |
The rear face of a fortification. |
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MATTROSS |
Assistant gunner. |
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MERLON |
The wall which separates embrasures. |
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ORILLON |
The recessed shoulder of a bastion, permitting a greater degree of flanking fire to be provided. |
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PALISADE |
A fence composed of pointed wooden stakes. |
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QF |
Quick-firing gun. A breech-loader; introduced in the 1880's. |
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RAVELIN |
An arrowhead-shaped work used to protect a curtain or a gateway. Sometimes referred to as a Couvre Port. |
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REDOUBT |
A small enclosed work without bastions. |
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REFUSED |
The flanks of a rampart are said to be refused when they are angled back from the general alignment. |
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REVETMENT |
Stone lining applied to the face of a ditch. |
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RML |
Rifled muzzle-loader. |
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STAR FORT |
Fort with a star-shaped trace. |
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TERREPLEIN |
The area of rampart behind the parapet where the guns are mounted. |
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TRACE |
Ground-plan of a fortification. |
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TRAVERSE |
An earthwork bank on the terreplein placed at right angles to the parapet to provide shelter from enfilading fire. |
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TROUS-DE-LOUP |
Obstacles consisting of pits with sharpened stakes in the bottom. |
The fortifications are designed
The Berry Head promontory has been the site of coastal defences from prehistoric times to the Second World War. Lysons mentions the existence of an earthwork [2] and Donn's map of 1765 'Ruins of a Danish Castle'. The site was subsequently used by the Romans - coins have turned up in the area, but as far as is known no further defensive works were undertaken until the War of American Independence.
In 1779 the risk of a French invasion was very real, and it was decided to establish coast defence batteries around Torbay. At the time the commanding Royal Engineer at Plymouth, with responsibility for the whole of the Western District, was Lt.Colonel Dixon. He wrote to the Board of Ordnance on November 1:
"Foreseeing a difficulty to arise in the execution of the batteries in Torbay, by depending solely on the inhabitants of the Country to Work ; and being of Opinion they now benefit more by pursuing their Fishery than they would benefit by being employed and paid at the usual stipend of Labourers....I intreat the Board to make an application to the Commander in Chief of His Majesty's Forces, to order for this duty two Companies of Militia, one Company to be quartered in the Town of Brixham for the two batteries intended for the South West side, and one Company to be quartered in the Village of Tor Quay and its neighbourhood for the two batteries intended for the North East side ; by which arrangement of Men, the four batteries may be carried on at the same time.
The first work to be done in the four positions, where the batteries are to be made, is to erect Guard-houses, to serve as a shelter for the men, against the uncertainty of the Weather, in places so much exposed.
As these batteries are intended to cover and protect Ships of War, as they lay at Anchor on each side the bay, I may reasonably suppose the commanding Captain of the Ships would send Seamen ashore to arm the batteries, and to furnish them with Powder; for which reason, I have now in contemplation the making of two Ammunition boxes to be mounted on low wooden Trucks for each battery, to contain no more than twenty rounds of filled Cartridges Per Gun, instead of erecting Magazines to lodge a Quantity of Powder in barrels...."[3]
He requested £500 to pay the men engaged in erecting the batteries. The Board directed him to proceed as rapidly as possible, within his estimated cost of £988.[4] It proved to be necessary to erect a proper magazine; probably the expected naval co-operation was not forthcoming, the relations between the generals and the admirals at Plymouth at this time being very bad indeed.[5] Work began on February 21, 1780. The requested £500, however, had still not been sent by March, and Dixon was forced to write:
"Permit me to remind the Board of an Imprest of £500 not yet granted for the Batteries at Torbay; and as that Service is now in hand; I beg the Board will be pleased to grant the same....to enable me to carry on the batteries with dispatch. I may venture to assure the Board the batteries on the Berry head will be compleated by the time the Swedish Guns with their proper proportion of Stores and Ammunition are sent from Woolwich." [6] Twenty-five 20 pounder guns and carriages were sent in May, followed by two 8" howitzers in June.
Dixon wished the land on which the batteries stood to be purchased, but the Board did not consider that this was necessary for temporary batteries, except in cases where the land could not be obtained any other way. The Lords of the Manor of Brixham applied for compensation for the financial losses caused by the installations; in June the Board approved the suggestion that the sum be decided by arbitration - this matter was to drag on for years before a final settlement was made.[7]
On November 9 Dixon was able to report that "The Batteries on the Berry head, Hardy's head, Old Castle, and Fishcomb point, with their Magazine, guard house and Storehouses, as described by the Plan and Sections which accompany this report, are now compleated agreable to the Board's Order; but the batteries proposed by me to be erected at Paington [sic] red bank and the North east side the bay, will not be entered on, until the Arbitrators have settled a compensation for taking possession of the proprietors lands." [8] The plan has been preserved; it shows the locations of the batteries with sections through each position. [9] The largest was placed at the tip of the headland, with a square magazine behind it, and a howitzer battery positioned on the Torbay side of the tip. The other batteries, Hardy's Head, Castle and Furzdon, became part of the later defences. The map shows not only the associated structures of two storehouses and a house, probably a guardhouse, but also, spanning the neck of the headland, the "Ruins of a Roman Wall". This appears to be the only plan which preserves an apparently accurate record of this now destroyed feature. It is not shown on the 1781 map of Torbay published by the Hydrographical Office, "Tor-Bay surveyed by Lt.Murdoch Mackenzie" which does show four of the batteries, with the exception of the Howitzer battery. [10] During the construction of the present defences some Roman masonry was noted in the earthwork. [11]
£150 was requested for the works in July 1781, and after the second winter some remedial work was necessary. Sergeant Bayne, in charge of Fishcombe battery, wrote to Dixon on February 1 1782 "I am sorry to Inform you that there is about four yards of the sods of the foundation of fishcomb battery on the Northwest side fell down, and some More likely to go the Same Way as it Bulges out very Much." [12] £500 was requested that month; apart from the repair work, preparations were being made for the Torquay batteries. Dixon informed Sir Robert Palk on March 17 that the Board had ordered them to be erected on Palk land, and asked for an estimate of the damage. [13] The peace negotiations of the summer, however, probably prevented any work from taking place. In January 1783 the estimate of the compensation due for Berry Head was sent in; it was claimed that six quarries underneath the batteries had been rendered useless, which used to produce annually eighty-six boat loads of limestone. This was worth five shillings a boat load to the proprietors, a total of £21 10s. They also wished to charge two guineas a year rental for the land occupied. [14]
That autumn the Inspector of Artillery, Major Blomefield, surveyed the coast defences, and as a consequence it was decided in November that all the guns at Berry Head, with the exception of those at Fishcombe, were to be removed to Plymouth, together with all the materials from the buildings. The Hanoverian troops stationed at Brixham were ordered to furnish working parties for this purpose. [15]
The batteries had been dismantled, but the matter of compensation was still not settled. Dixon wrote to the Board in September 1786 about the matter, and arbitrators were finally agreed upon on December 9. [16] By then the Colonel had retired through ill-health. His successor was Lt.Col. Andrew Mulcaster, who reported the final settlement of this affair to the Master General of the Ordnance, Charles Lennox, the third Duke of Richmond. It appears that inflated claims had been made, for "The Estimate of the Annual Damages of £23.10, Sustained by the Lords of the Manor of Brixham, Your Grace will find was very lamely supported for instead of that sum the Gentlemen from the Evidence produced in support of the Claim, thought the Sum of £5 a Year an ample Compensation; and which accordingly has been Awarded them, the time this Ground was in Possession of the Ordnance was four Years." [17]
On February 1 1793 the French Republic declared war on England, and the coastal defences so recently dismantled were now urgently required. Berry Head was earmarked for reactivation, on a much greater scale, this time as a permanent fortification. On April 8th, 1794, the following letter from the office of the Master-General, the Duke of Richmond, was sent to the new Commanding Engineer at Devonport; Lt.Col .Alexander Mercer had only been promoted the previous month. He was to become Major-General in 1796, Lt.General in 1803, and, after leaving Plymouth, full General in 1813, dying at Exmouth on November 10 1816. -
"I am directed by The Master General to desire you will go to Torbay and form a Plan for Fortifying the Berry Head, that is, in the first place, for Erecting such Batteries on that Hill as shall best protect the Shipping and the Entrance to Torbay
2dly. To enclose these Batteries, so that an Enemy landing Infantry in the Neighbourhood may not get possession of them without being obliged to break Ground, and erect Batteries.
3dly. To have Barracks for 600 Men to defend these Batteries, which Barracks may be sent ready framed from London and will then only require putting up, Brick Hogging, Plaistering and Building the Chimneys. Each Barrack is 100 feet long by 22, from out to out, and will contain 2 Officers and 60 Men. The Men are not to dress their Victuals in the Barracks but Cooking Places are to be put up for that purpose according to the Plan which has been tried and found to answer for similar buildings at Hythe, on the Coast of Sussex, which Captain Twiss is to Explain and a Copy of his Description will be sent down to you, as soon as possible.
4thly. If there is no Water in the space proposed to be occupied by these Works, a Tank must be made to receive the Water from the Buildings. These Buildings may be covered with Slate which can be got in the neighbourhood.
The Master General thinks the Ground you are likely to want belongs to the Duke of Bolton, but wishes enquiries to be immediately made, a Survey taken and as much Ground Demanded as is necessary, in which His Grace desires that you will take care to have a sufficiency in front of the Works so that at no time any Buildings may be Erected to incommode them.
The Master General further desires that you will take care that the Works are no where Commanded, altho' this should give the Works somewhat more Extent." [18]
This letter gives a clear explanation of the purpose of the fortification. Coastal defences were usually taken by a coup de main from the landward side by troops which had been landed further down the coast, and the defensive works had to be very strong on that side. In the case of Berry Head, the precipitous cliffs formed a perfect defence on the seaward side. The purpose of fortifications was to delay the enemy whilst reinforcements could be brought up; the fall of a fortress was usually certain, with a competent engineer in charge of the siege, but the operation took time and could not be rushed.
Mercer's plans were ready by July 14, when three sections through the proposed works were sent to the Drawing Room of the Board of Ordnance to be copied. [19] These original drawings do not survive. However, two sets of plans drawn up in 1803 are preserved. One set is Mercer's Autograph, and the other is a fair copy from the official Drawing Room. They are identical except in the degree of finish: the official draughtsmen were Compton and Holberton. The original design, which was executed for the most part, is the sheet dated Feb.24, 1803, captioned "Plan of the Works at the Berry Head as Projected by His Grace the Duke of Richmond" Like its companion drawings, it is an accomplished drawing in ink and watercolour.
General Mercer's design solution, as executed, protects the area of the tip of the headland set aside for two batteries, barracks, stores, parade ground etc. by a revetted wall and dry ditch spanned by a drawbridge. This is redoubt No.3. A separate redoubt, No.1, placed in advance, flanks the approach to No.3, and would need to be taken first in a separate operation by attackers, as its fire, if left unsuppressed, would take them in flank. No cannon embrasures are provided on the side facing No.3, it being assumed that it would be adequately protected by fire from No.3. The masonry revetments are of the same type as those of Redoubts 4 and 5 on Maker Heights, which were largely built according to the Duke of Richmond's designs, the earthworks being completed in 1783 and the revetments applied in 1789-1790. There is no means of providing enfilade fire down the ditch from a secure position. The ends of the ramparts are angled back to provide some measure of enfilade fire being delivered, though at great risk. However, the alternative plans drawn up show that a much more effective design was in fact proposed. Plans of the proposed works, as well as those actually executed, were made by official draughtsmen of the Board of Ordnance in February 1803 from Mercer's originals (which also survive.) These are titled respectively
1) Plan of the Works on the Berry Head as Projected by His Grace the Duke of Richmond. (Signed Tho.Compton, Feb.24, 1803 )
2) Plan of the Works at the Berry Head, with a Couvre Port to the Line no.3, and without the Demi Bastion No.2 and Line No.4. (Signed Tho.Compton, Feb.23, 1803 )
3) Plan showing the proposed Couvre Port [ Plan and Section ]
4) Plan of the Duke of Richmond's Casemates in the Flank of No.2 Demi-Bastion
5) Sections of the Duke of Richmond's Casemated Work of No.2 Demi-Bastion.
6) Plan of the Casemates, in the Flank of No.2.Demi-Bastion with a more Contracted Passage, to obviate the Groined Arches, in the Original Plan. (Signed R.R.Holberton, Feb 24 1803)
7) Section of the Casemated Flank of No.2.Demi-Bastion with the Contracted Passage. (Signed R.R.Holberton, Feb 24 1803 ) [20]
The Duke of Richmond's design adds a third principal work, a polygonal redoubt, No.2, surrounded by a ditch on all sides, in advance of both the other works. This is a strong work with casemated barracks in one of the faces. Behind it another work, No.4, much simpler and not separately defensible, protects the Castle Battery. ( All the old positions of 1780 were re-occupied, on a more permanent basis.) Acting with No.l, these two works would afford a vastly improved protection for No.3.
The other design, with the "Couvre Port" as it is not specifically ascribed to the Duke of Richmond, may be assigned to Mercer. This shows the work as executed, save for the important addition of a ravelin in front of the entrance to No.3. This should have solved the problem of enfilading the ditch of No.3, but quite extraordinarily the ravelin has been made too small for the purpose. Its ditches are swept by the fire of the work behind it, but it has no command over that of No.3. It makes, however, a considerably stronger defence than that actually provided.
Why was such a relatively ineffective fortification erected after all this? The answer probably lies in the disputes and quarrels which the fortification plans of the Duke of Richmond had provoked. In 1785 and 1786 his elaborate schemes for the defence of the dockyards of Portsmouth and Plymouth had been sponsored by Pitt, but had been defeated in the House of Commons after bitter debates and a minor pamphlet war, much of the opposition being on personal grounds rather than military considerations. Following this defeat he had not resigned his office, but contrived to salvage as much of his cherished plans as possible, erecting Fort Cumberland (or rather initiating it: construction dragged on until 1811) under cover of modifying an existing building at Southsea, and revetting two of the redoubts on Maker Heights. Now, at the beginning of the war, he was involved in a quarrel with the Duke of York which would prove fatal to his career at the Ordnance. They had been on very bad terms in 1789 when York had engaged in an abortive duel with Richmond's nephew, and the conduct of the war provided ample opportunities for renewed friction between the two men.
After York had been appointed commander of the British forces on the continent, the Duchess of Richmond wrote in February 1793 to her husband "The Nation must be ruined now that Master Frederick may have a plaything that I doubt he does not know how to manage..." [21] and again in April, (after Richmond had severely criticised the conduct of the war) in a letter which also indicates that the Duke's concern for the defence of England had not abated - "I am much hurt at your fatiguing yourself, for the whims of a foolish Boy....I cannot but fancy your Kentish & Sussex Tour of some little importance for there's no knowing what the French will not attempt, & I need not observe how much hurt you would be at their gaining the most trifling advantages by any neglect of yours - so do pray my Dear Husband consider if that is not more Essential Business for you than what can be done by others." [22]
The capture of Dunkirk was intended, and the planning began after the Duke had gone to summer camp with his militia, leaving the Ordnance in the hands of others. Through some kind of administrative confusion the required guns were never sent for the operation, which was a failure. The Duchess foretold the outcome: "I am happy to hear that you can prove them in the wrong that reflect upon you; i let me intreat you to be guarded on this occasion, for every Body has not the honest fair way of proceeding that you have, & they certainly will try to shufle the fault upon you, partly to save themselves, & perhaps to get rid of you; to be sure it would be quarrelling with their Bread & Butter to do so, but great Genius's now & then overshoot themselves. It seems very odd to me that they shou'd put Artillery Men in Boats without your knowledge; I suppose they will say that your being at Camp was the reason, but I think it none at all as they by Express coud communicate so soon with you. You must insist upon the Kings hearing you, & take every Public Manner of making the merits of the case known in the fewest words possible, for long stories lay one open." [23] Despite being duly made the scapegoat, He remained in office, though confined for some time to his Goodwood estate by gout. His removal from office in February 1795 was to follow from the appointment of the Duke of York to the post of Commander-in-Chief.
Richmond over the years had antagonised people both in the Office of Ordnance and the Royal Engineers, and schemes which he had promoted were perhaps now not favoured. Also economy, always a (not perhaps unreasonable) obsession with the Board, certainly had a part in the acceptance of this mutilated scheme of defence.
Perhaps a deeper reason lay in the lack of training of British engineer officers in the science of fortification, which itself was caused by the British Army's lack of experience in Continental warfare. In the words of perhaps the greatest practical expert on fortification and siegecraft that England has produced, Major-General John Jones (1783-1843) "The happy insular situation of Great Britain, and its maritime superiority, have ever caused but little attention to be paid to land defences at home, or to the service connected therewith.." [24]
Jones was the engineer at many of Wellington's Spanish sieges, the conduct of which he condemned; and, indeed, there was much to condemn. Bravery was used in place of professional skill; men were wholly ignorant of the art of sapping and the infantry were quite uninstructed in the importance of entrenching and consequently unwilling to undertake it, great and unneccesary loss of life being the result.
Not only were British siege tactics defective, but the designs of the forts of the celebrated (and highly successful) Torres Vedras Lines were faulty too. Some of the early ones were star-shaped, which had great deficiencies in providing useful fields of fire, and an amateurish approach was shown in other respects as well: "Many of the redoubts were placed on very elevated situations on the summit of steep hills, which gave them a most imposing appearance ; but it was in reality a defect... for the fire of their artillery on the object to be guarded became so plunging as to lose half its powers ; the musketry could not be made to scour the face of the hill sufficiently… The domineering situation of the redoubts, however, gave confidence to the young troops which composed the garrisons, protected them from a cannonade, and screened their interior from musketry, unless fired at a high angle, and consequently at random. These considerations perhaps justify the unusually elevated sites selected for most of the redoubts on the lines, though they cannot induce an approval of them as a general measure." [25] It is against this background that the Berry Head defences have to be seen.
Construction begins
The Master-General of the Ordnance authorised the construction to begin in a letter of August 16 1794; the Duke of Richmond was an enthusiastic advocate and exponent of fortification and he characteristically suggested an alteration to Mercer's scheme :
"Sir
I am to desire that you will proceed with the Works proposed to be Erected on Berry Head at Torbay, conformable to the Plans you have transmitted, taking care not to exceed your Estimate amounting to £30.595..0..0.
I would however have you consider the Idea I have already mentioned to you whether in the Execution of these Works some part of the Expence of Excavation may not be saved by making the Ditches nearly Parallel to the different Lines of yr Works instead of excavating them as before a Curtain." [26] It is not clear what Richmond meant by this. Certainly the ditches have not been constructed with a covered way (a pathway on the outer edge of the ditch, protected by a parapet) which the curtain of bastioned fort would have. Work advanced rapidly and on the 12th of September Mercer wrote to the Duke stating "The Money last Impressed being nearly expended, I have the Honor to Request that you will be pleased to grant a further Imprest of £1500....for further proceeding with the Works at Torbay and the general Repairs &c in this Division." On October 17 a further £2000 was requested. [27]
An insight into the cost of labour and materials for the fort is given in a letter of November 27 from the contractor, Mrs.Croad, to the Board of Ordnance:
"...I can with great Truth assure the Honble Board that I should not have presumed to trouble them on light or trivial Ground, or on a few fluctuating Articles, which might soon resume the Prices at which they were formerly purchased, but when so material a loss as upwards of £40 independent of Interest of Money Agency &c has already been sustained by me since the commencement of the Works at Torbay in July last, on the Articles of Labour only and a probability of its being rather worse than better, I am humbly led to hope that the Honble Board on Account of the hardship I at present Labour under will be pleased to allow me the following prices for Labour and Materials in this Division as are herein after particularized...
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Masons Prices. |
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Moorstone at Torbay |
2.6 per day |
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Delabole Slate Rags at Maker, Island, Staten Heights or Torbay |
from 1.2.6 to 1.4.6 supl |
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Bricklayers Prices for any Work that may be performed at Torbay instead of those at present allowd Bricklayers " labourers |
from 2.8 to 3.0 p dy " 1.8 to 1.10 " |
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The Present price for Ragstock Bricks in yr Division is only |
3.9 p hd. |
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The Freight from here to Torbay Delivered at yr Quay there is at least |
0.9 Do |
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which increases yr Price to |
4. 6 Do |
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From whence there is a Distance of nearly 2 Miles to carry then to yr Works, over a very Steep Hill and a bad Road which will cost me at least |
10 |
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increasing yr Price if delivered to yr Works to |
5,4 p hd. |
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|
independent of the Duty now nearly 5d P Cn which is at present allowed us, I therefore humbly request the Honble Board to allow me for Red & Grey Stock Bricks delivered at Brixham Quay including the Duty whether used on Measured or Day Work 4.10 p hd and if delivered on the Works, whether used on measured or Day Work 5.0 Do |
||
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Labour and Work done by measuremt. on straight erect Walls |
fm 1.12.0 to 1.16.0 p Rod |
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Do on Arches |
fm 1.14.0 to 2.0.0 Do |
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I have the Honor to be
&c &c
Susanna Croad[28]
It is noteworthy that some work clearly took place at Berry Head from the beginning of July, before Mercer had completed his plans, let alone received the Master-General's instructions to begin construction. In the absence of the relevant documents one can only assume that it had been definitely decided to to erect some kind of defence on the Head, and the work done in July and early August was the general clearance and preparation of the site.
On March 21 1795 Mercer requested a further £2000 for the work at Torbay and general repairs in the Division; [29] the Ordnance Office in reply told him to be more specific -
"I have to request you will be so good to inform me what part of the Sum of £2000 which you have demanded for Works at Torbay and Repairs at Plymouth is for the Service of Torbay and that in your future applications you will be so good to mention the particular Sum wanted for that Service, as the account must be kept totally distinct from the Repair in the Division." [30]
Mercer replied on the 31st -
"....I beg leave to inform you that the Sum of £800 was designed for this Service; but as all the Bills hitherto made out for Works at Torbay have been kept separate from the other Works & Repairs in the Division, and their Amount distinctly Abstracted in the Housekeepers Account at this Place, I did not conceive it at all material in my Demand to say how much was designed for this particular Service; I will however give directions for keeping the Demands separate in future, as you desire." [31]
By the summer of 1795 the great earthworks began to be constructed. On May 14 Mercer despatched a "Demand of Intrenching Tools for Service of the New Works carrying on at Torbay, and to Request that the Honble Board will be pleased to give directions for
their being supplied...
|
Pinching Bars |
20 |
|
Wedges Small |
30 |
|
Gads 1 size |
50 |
|
2 " |
50 |
|
3 " |
50 |
|
Wood Mallets |
50 |
|
Scoop |
30 |
|
Wheel Barrows |
300 |
|
Hand " |
100 |
This list of equipment gives some idea of the work force employed on the site. Requests for £1000 were made on May 30 and July 23. [33] Mrs.Croad's attempts to increase her charges seem to have been resisted by the Board, and she appears to have persuaded Mercer to put her case, as appears by a letter from the Board dated August 31. -
"Sir,
I am commanded by the Honble Surveyor General to acquaint you in Answer to your Letter of 10 Inst; that for the Reasons given by you in the said Letter, he consents to Allow Mrs Croad 3s pr Day for a Bricklayer at Torbay all the Year round ; but he desires that Allowance may be confined to Torbay only." [34]
The work was not only carried on by Mrs.Croad's men; a small detachment of Military Artificers were also stationed there. They had been there since August 1 1794, and suffered some ill-health, as the following letter from the Board to Mercer shows:
"Sir,
Having laid before the Board your Letter of 27 Augst last, transmitting Messr Elford and Langworthys Bill amounting to £4.2.8 for Medicine and Attendance upon yr Detachment of Military Artificers under Your Command at Brixham and submitting the propriety of allowing Messrs Elford and Langworthy 2s/6d or 3s p Day for the Time they may attend at Brixham instead of permitting them to make out Monthly Bills....they are to be allowed 2-/6d p Day for taking care of the Detachment of Royal Military Artificers from the 1st of August last..." [35]
Two requests for £500 and one for £800 were made January 7, February 4 and March 31 1796 respectively [36] , and on April 25 Mercer sent the Board "a Bill for Glazier's Works performed by Mr Samuel Hay ward of London on account of the New Works at Torbay." [37] The buildings, then, were complete enough to be glazed.
Further requests for £800 followed on July 11 and October 27 [38] but on December 1 Mercer received this order: "...the Master General and Board...think proper [that] any further Progress in the Works at Torbay and the Berry Head should be postponed for this Year." [39] This was the first break in the construction of the forts.
Mercer replied to the Board on the 4th "...in Obedience to the Orders of the Master General & Board, I have written to Torbay to Stop all further Progress in the Works at the Berry Head. But I have desired that Detachment of Royal Military Artificers and Labourers may remain to Guard the Works, Materials, and Intrenching Tools &c till further Orders.." [40]
The Overseer at Berry Head was Henry Gillett; he had started his career as a clerk in the Master General's office, and had been made Overseer in 1773. Before coming to Berry Head, he had previously worked on the fortifications of Maker, and so had experience in the construction of revetted redoubts. He was in charge throughout the construction of the defences, being paid 5s a day. [41] He received this order from Mercer: "...you will immediately upon the receipt of this letter, stop all further Progress in the Works at the Berry Head. You will understand by this that not One Man is to be retained upon that Service; as the Royal Military Artificers & Labourers will remain to Guard the Works & Materials, till further Orders." [42]
It was to be over two years before any significant new works were undertaken. 1797 only records, on February 22, "An Incidental Bill for Coppers at Torbay. £34.4.0" [43] In the summer of 1798 the gun-platforms of the sea-batteries required relaying, and the letters from the Board to Mercer are of great interest as showing that softwood was considered a suitable material for this purpose and that Fort No.1 was in fact cannibalised for the purpose.
"Having laid before the Board Your Letter of yr 30 Ultd transmitting Three Estimates for relaying the Platforms of the Sea Batteries at Torbay.
I am directed to acquaint you that the Board prefer that the Platforms of the Sea Batteries at Torbay should be relaid with Fir conformably to the Estimate you have transmitted Amounting to £448-18s-6d."
"I have submitted to the Board Your Letter of yr 7th Instant respecting the Platforms of the Sea Batteries at Torbay; and I am to acquaint You that they approve of Your Suggestion for removing the 18 unoccupied Platforms in the Redout No. 1 to make good those of the 12 Gun Battery at the Point of the Berry Head, and the five Gun Battery at Fishcombes Point, instead of relaying the Platforms of those Batteries as directed in my Letter of the 4 Instant." [44] On August 16 a request for £50 was made for this purpose. [45]
The barrack facilities which had been constructed were incomplete in many respects, and Mercer wrote to the Board on August 12 "representing the Necessity of erecting an Officers Guard Room in No. 3 at the Berry Head." This was approved in a reply of the 28th, "...but you will take care that the Sum Estimated for that Work be not exceeded." [46]
The inadequacies of the accommodation were about to be pointed out forcefully. Colonel Bastard's 1st Devonshire Militia recorded in its Order Book on 14 Oct 1798 : "The Colonels Major Laroche & Capt Williams Companies, will March on Tuesday morning next the 16th.,.to the Berry Head." [47] Their comments upon the living quarters were uniformly unfavourable, and Bastard wrote at once to the Board of Ordnance:
"Sir.
Part of the Regiment under my Command being destined to Winter at Berry head, I ordered the Major to visit the Barracks there and report to me his observations on them. He informs me there is no Mess room, or Kitchen, No store Room for the Regimental Stores, not even for Powder, no Hospital, No place for the coals which are flung loose about the Kitchens. I need not point out to you the necessity of these things, but I think is right to state the local Situation of the place renders it impossible in the Winter, to move a Sick Man without great danger to the Patient, which I am sure is all that need to be stated to you on that subject, I beg also to State to you that I will readily permit as many men as you may wish... to work on any buildings, that are to be erected, so that they may be finish'd before the Winter renders their work precarious, The Major further reports, that an Alteration is wanted in one of the Gutters, and is extremely unhealthy, & offensive, That one of the Tanks is spoiled, that the Tank doors are beginning to decay, & will soon be dangerous for if they give way on any Person crossing them would be drowned, That the Barracks want White washing, for which purpose we can supply you with the Men used to the business. & that there are no Racks for the Musketts which are at present hung on a Nail by the Guard of the Trigger, that the Barrack No.l leaks under the Windows, and that the Chimney No 3 Smoaks.
He also informs me that ColoL Grege, who now Commands in the Barracks told him, that he had not been able to procure any good Beer from Brixham, Since he had been there. I should suppose the Complaint might be remedied by procuring the Beer either from Totness or Dartmouth, tho' it would be attended with some increase of expence in the Carriage. If you will be so obliging to lett me know what your determination on these subjects is, and what men you would wish to employ on the Buildings, before the Regiment Marches from thence, which will probably be the latter end of this Week, I will take care that proper people, of the descriptions wanted shall be stationed at Berry Head.
I have the Honor to be
with great respect
Sir
Your Obedt Humble Servt
J.P.Bastard Lt.Col.
Plymouth Dock Barracks,
Octr 8th 1798.
To Gen.De Lancey." [48]
Some mitigation was in prospect ; on the 27th Mercer requested "the Sum of £100 for proceeding with the Erection of the Guard House within the Line No.3 on the Berry Head." [49]
The 1st Devon Militia maintained several detachments there during 1798 and 1799, during which period the Headquarters of the Regiment were established at Totnes. The scanty glimpses of life there given by the Regimental Order Books tend to show that no great improvements had taken place, as militiamen were usually sent there for disciplinary purposes.
31 Oct. 1798.
Geo.Chubb of the Lt.Col's Company, is ordered to the Berry Head, to be bill'd up and Drill'd there till further Orders for being Disgracefully Drunk in the Streets of Totness last Night between nine and ten o'clock he is moreover to mount two Extra Guards besides his regular rotation of Duty in that Garrison.
17 Dec.1798.
Lance Corpl. Pascoe is appointed Corporal in the Room of Corpl.Jnr Warren reduced by the Colonels Order for Gambling with the private Men in one of the Hutts at the Berry Head.
19 Jan. 1799.
The three companies at the Berry Head will be in readiness to parade with Arms on Monday Morning next at Eleven o'clock if the weather permits.
15 Feb. 1799.
The Colonels Major Laroches & Capt Bidgoods Companies will March to the Berry Head.
20 March 1799.
The Colonels and Major Laroches Companies will hold themselves in readiness to March from their present Quarters at the Berry Head to relieve the Lieut Colonels and Capt Fulfords Compy on Sunday next the 24th Instant.
12 May 1799.
Lt Colonel Bastard orders that Geo.Chubb of his own Company be sent as a prisoner to the Berry Head, and be Confind in the Black Hole 48 hours on Bread & Water, and also to be Bill'd up and Drill'd in the Garrison till further Orders, for being Drunk on the first parade he was Ordered to attend after his arrival at Totnes.
15 May 1799.
Liet.Col.Bastard orders that Jnr Dawson Drummer be sent as a Prisoner to the Berry Head to be Confin'd in the Black Hole for 48 Hours on Bread and Water, for being Disgracefully Drunk and seditious in a publick House in Totness on Wednesday the 15th....and that he be March'd back a prisoner to Totness when his Time of Confinement is Expird.
18 May 1799.
Captn.Brown and Captn Bulteels Companies to the Berry Head and remain until further orders.
5 June 1799.
[ ? ] Melhuish of the Lt.Colonels Company is ordered to be confined in the Guard Room at the Berry Head on suspicion of making away with his necessaries and for Mutinous & Riotous Behaviour in the Town of Totness on Tuesday Evening.
23 July 1799.
The two Companies to be under Arms with packs & necessaries in Order for Muster to morrow morning at 8 o'Clock afterwards they will march to the Berry Head.
24 July 1799.
Priv Frost is Ordered to be bill'd up and Drilld till further Orders at Berry Head and to have no Furlough when the[y] are usu[a]lly granted for having Absented himself from Work and leaving the Cantonments of the Regiment when he had only Working Leave.
Corporal Concanen is Ordered Six Extra Guards and to be Billd and Drilld at Berry Head till further Orders for having reported that he had visited Priv Frost at the place he had Leave to work at when he had left the Cantonments of the Regiment.
The Colonel hopes that a Similar Circumstance will not happen again as it would be the means of preventing the Indulgences he is enabled to give from the General good behaviour of the Regiment." [50]
Other regiments, as well as the Gunners, were of course based there as well. The historian of Tiverton, Martin Dunsford, visited the area around this time; his brief mention shows that some guns were in position on the sea batteries. "Here was a battery of twelve pieces of cannon, forty-two pounders, each gun sixty-five hundredweight, and two or three smaller batteries at several places, on the descent towards Brixham, with the guns pointed in different directions towards the Bay. Within the fortifications on the summit of the hill are five barracks for about five hundred men, the Berkshire Militia were in them at this time, and had a fine band of music." [51]
The Board of Ordnance had little enthusiasm for spending money on barrack accommodation, and with the departure of Napoleon for Egypt felt no pressing reason for completing the fortifications themselves. They therefore wrote to Mercer on March 18 1799:
"Of the Works proposed at the Berry Head Torbay it appears that building a Guard House at No. 3 Estimated at £727-1-2, has already been ordered; And the Lieut. General and Board approve of your executing the Artillery Store & Guard House together with the Expense Magazine proposed at N° 1 The Amount of these put together will be £573.0.0.
The Completion of the Field Works on Berry Head is for the present to be postponed, but the four small Furnaces for heating the Shot at the Sea Batteries are to be executed, and the Expence defrayed out of the Money remaining unexpended.
The Amount of the Estimates will therefore be as follows
|
£ |
s |
d |
|
|
No. 1 Estimate |
3548 |
19 |
9 |
|
No. 2 Do not alter'd |
788 |
0 |
0 |
|
No.3 Do |
2406 |
0 |
2 ¼ |
|
6742 |
19 |
11 ¼ |
The Mess House, Coal Yard, Beer Cellar, and other accommodations mentioned in the latter part of your Letter, as wanted by the Troop stationed on the Berry Head, should be supplied by the Barrack Department." [52]
On April 29 Mercer requested £200 to proceed with the works at No.1, and a further £40 on November 6. [53] No new works were undertaken during 1800, though on September 23 the Board wrote to Mercer that "Lieut Colonel Stephens Commandr the Royal Artillery at Plymouth having reported to the Board that all the Guns and Carriages at Berry Head, from Their being so much exposed requires Painting,
I am commanded by The Board to acquaint you therewith, and to request you will transmit an Estimate of the Expence that will attend the Painting of them." This was reckoned at £18.19.9, and the guns were "puttied and painted" accordingly. [54]
The gentry prepare for invasion
During the early stages of the construction of the fortifications many schemes of defence, supplementary to the militia, were being hatched by local magnates. The levies their plans proposed to raise would very likely have been called upon to serve in the redoubts of Berry Head, as part of the value of fortifications was considered to be as an efficient way of employing partly trained men. As a former Surveyor-general of the Ordnance put it "Veteran troops only could be opposed to veterans in the open field, and superior numbers of the enemy must probably succeed; but within forts, militia, seamen, almost any stout brave fellow might be as useful in the article of defence as the most experienced soldier." [55]
It was realised that the militia alone would be insufficient to provide the required force, and on April 17 1794 an Act was passed "for encouraging and disciplining such troops, or companies of men, as shall voluntarily enrol themselves for the defence of their counties, towns, or coasts, or for the general defence of the kingdom during the present war." This had four main provisions.
Volunteers duly recruited and officered were entitled to pay at the same rates as Regulars if and when they were called out to resist invasion or to suppress "riots and tumults"; in such cases they were to be subject to the same military discipline and laws as the Regulars and the Militia, but the Courts Martial were to be composed of Volunteer officers only.
NCO's and drummers were to be entitled to billetting if called out. Commissioned officers disabled in service were to be entitled to half-pay, and if killed their widows would receive a pension for life; NCO's and privates who were disabled were to be eligible for Chelsea Hospital.
Volunteers were to be exempt from the Militia ballot and service if they had for the previous six weeks punctually attended at all exercises.
With this encouragement, the following years saw many local organisations promoted in Devon. Some of the plans remained unfulfilled: one such was the following proposal for volunteer artillery sent on March 1st. 1797 by Sir John Coxe Hippisley to the Commander in Chief, the Duke of York:
"Sir
At a crisis so serious as the present I believe there are but few of his Majesty's Subjects whose contemplation is not fixed on the same object. Even where the Spirit of genuine Patriotism is slow to be roused, the principle of self preservation at least will naturally be alive in all. In this persuasion Sir I take the liberty of submitting to Your Royal Highness the rude Sketch of a project which appears, in my humble judgment, to be capable of being moulded by Professional hands, into a form of immediate public utility.
The moment when we have fresh on the public mind the spirited and efficacious exertion of the Welch Peasantry [56] seems to be well salted to inculcate similar exertions directed to the easy formation of a solid defensive Cordon, of formidable annoyance, extending throughout all the Coast of Great Britain, which may be accessible to the smallest veasels of transport.
I will suppose, Sir, that each Parish (or Association of parishes when they are small) to the extent of thirty or forty miles within the coast were provided, by means of a voluntary subscription or by a County Rate, with two or more Field Pieces (or Howitzers), and for such service of emergency even Ship Guns mounted on Field Carriages hastily provided from the nearest Royall Yards, Arsenalls, or Sea Port Towns might sufficiently answer the purpose, accompanied with Stout Carts fitted as extempore Tumbrils with appropriate Ammunition &c. All which to be deposited in the Parish Church,.. Training to take place, perhaps under the direction of a Chelsea Pensioner, after Church Service. The Parish Officers authorised to allow on such occasions a moderate quantity of Beer to drink the Health of his Majesty &c.
Some Horses might be attached to this Rustic Artillery in aid of the Peasantry, though I need not suggest to your Royal Highness that their habits of life, accustomed to the Plough and the Spade and to draw and lift considerable weights, are much better suited to exertions of this description, than as Horsemen.
Pioneer's tools might also be kept, the labourers would require no training in their use ... The Principle seems to offer a much more efficacious and formidable defence than can be expected from the desultory exertions of our Provisional Cavalry on the present System.
The Strength and Activity of the Peasantry may be thus called forth in the mode most congenial with their habits of labour, and by establishing Signals from Parish to Parish, a powerful accumulated Battery might be brought to bear on an adventurous Enemy, at the confused moment of disembarkation, before they could possibly form on any part of our coast, to our serious annoyance.
Volunteer Associations of Gentlemen and the superior Yeomanry might officer these Patriot Bands, and at certain Stations on the Coast some Invalid Artillery Officers. Mattrosses or Chelsea Pensioners might be advantageously stationed, connecting this Cordon ...
I might add Sir that in Great Britain a great number of Gentlemen on the Coast (indeed there is scarcely a River or a Harbour where they are not to be found) - keep Pleasure Vessels generally well equipped and fast Sailers, which by a little spirited regulation and concert might on an
emergency, convey intelligence from Post to Post with great obvious advantage." [57]
These plans were not all mere paper theories suggested to the authorities : some local gentry brought local defence organisations into being, though the enthusiasm for the project was often restricted to the organisers, as the example of the retired Admiral Ourry at Ugborough shows : in March 1797 he printed and circulated 200 copies of the following leaflet to the principal citizens of the area -
"It was proposed to the Parish of Ugborough, the 19th of last March, to come to the following Agreement ; the Utility of which being fully explain'd, and perfectly well understood, to the Satisfaction of a full Meeting of the principal Inhabitants of the said Parish, by GEORGE OURRY, Esq, the said Agreement was unanimously sign'd, with Readiness and Loyalty, the 21st of the said Month ; since which, a Number of other neighbouring Parishes have entered into the same Agreement, as it gives Regularity to the Parishes, Security to Property, Strength to the Army, no Expence or Demands on Government, and will give great Force to the Country, if it be made general, of which there can be no Doubt, as it is much approv'd of by the Lord Lieutenant of the County, the Duke of Portland, Bishop of Exeter, Commanding Officer of his Majesty's Forces, Clergy, and Gentlemen at large in this Part of the County, as well as all the Farmers of those Parishes, who have join'd Hand in Hand, and pledg'd their Faith to each other, in the true Prosecution of the under Agreement ; the said Parishes are induced, for those Reasons above given, to recommend it to their Country, as no Man, that is a true Friend to himself, his Neighbour, and Old England, can object to so laudable and loyal a Scheme, as it will make us appear prepar'd to receive the enemy like true Britons.
The Articles of Agreement are
The principal Inhabitants and Farmers shall voluntarily divide themselves into Companies of eight or ten Men in each, and a respectable Inhabitant or Farmer to be their Chief or Captain.
When class'd into Companies, at the North, East, South, and West, as it may be most convenient to them, taking their Labourers as part of their Company; they will then be told where they are to assemble when the Alarm is given, and will be wanted to defend, what is most dear to them, from the Enemies of our gracious KING, and GLORIOUS CONSTITUTION.
They shall not be obliged to go out of their Parish on any Pretence whatever, but by their own free will and Inclination, but to do within the said Parish all such Work or Labour as shall be requir'd of them, by the Commanding Officer of his Majesty's Forces, then and near the said Parish, in case of an Invasion.
The Work requir'd of them will be to cut down Trees, break up Roads, make Breast-Works, in short, all such Works the Labourer is capable of, within the said Parish, for which he shall be paid, and agreed to be so, by the Parishioners.
As it will be very proper if the Enemy should land, to remove from the Sea-shore all live and dead Stock of every Kind, that it may not be made Use of by the Enemy, the Parish next to the Sea shall drive that Stock to the next Parish, and so on to the next, until it shall be out of the Power of the Enemy, and it may be saved for the proper Owners.
It shall be the Duty of said Parishioners to aid, assist, and succour all Convoys of Stores, Provisions, &c. going to, or from the Army, from their Parish to the next.
All the above being agreed to, and Time fix'd for its Duration to hold good, (which is six Months, or during the War) all the said Parishioners so agreed, Join Hand in Hand, pledging our Faith to each other, to assist each other in the true Prosecution of this our Agreement.
GOD Save the KING."
The Devon Record Office copy has an addendum in the Admiral's hand: "It is Requested that those Parishes which come in to the said Association shall Display a Union Flag on Top of the Church every Sunday, & in Case of Invasion to display it every Day, by which means the Army will know where to Expect the Assistance Proposed."
Unfortunately for the Admiral, the enthusiasm of his parishioners for this project was short-lived. On April 2nd 1798 he wrote to the Lord Lieutenant:
"My Lord ;
Inclosed is the agreement the Parish of Ugborough enterd into the 21st of March 1797, which was to continue for Six Months, to be renew'd if necessary ; at the expiration of that time I requested to renew it for the Duration of the War, which was refused by a great majority...[they said they would support] Government with their Lives & Fortunes, &... use every effort in their power to repel & annoy the Enemy, should an Invasion happen: but were determined not to enter into any written Engagement, which they were doubtful they could not fulfil. In consequence of their refusal, I desired the Union Flag might not appear any more on the Church, as the Army must not be deceived by false Colours..." [58]
More seriously, enthusiasm for the conflict was no greater within the armed forces. The mutinies of the Fleet at Spithead and the Nore are well known: but these were merely the overt part of a general disaffection. Lt.Col.J.P.Bastard of the 1st Devonshire Militia wrote on July 16 1797 to the Lord Lieutenant stating that morale in the Fleet had risen (he was wrong: severe disturbances were shortly to take place in the Hamoaze) but "I wish I could give you as good an account of the Marines, whose officers are certainly attentive and determined; ...but the Truth is, there are about Two hundred of them, who it is not thought prudent to trust with their Arms." [59]
Nor was the threat an illusory one. The Directory had decided on the expedition, and appointed Napoleon the Commander of the Army of England; the official order to that effect was issued on October 26 1797. Some fifty-six thousand men had been massed on the coast of France, though they were also needed for maintaining order there.
In these circumstances the role played in Home Defence by the Militia was an important one: the few records illustrative of service life at Berry Head come from the records of the 1st Devon Militia. Their commander, Colonel Bastard, was a forceful and capable man: interestingly, he had little belief in the value of fortifications, having spoken violently in the House of Commons in 1785 against Pitt's proposal to fortify Plymouth Dockyard. He was to suppress serious rioting at Plymouth in 1801. [60]
Not surprisingly, he also had a scheme for defence against invasion; the correspondence dealing with this has survived. Bastard made his original proposals in a letter to the Commander of the Western District, Lord George Lennox :
"My Lord
In the present New, & extraordinary Crisis, I trust I shall not be impertinent in asking your Lordship, If I from local circumstances, & connections, can render any assistance to your Lordship in the Defence of Plymouth, & Its Environs. If your Lordship considers the Military which can be spared, in the General Distribution of the National Force, for this District sufficient for that purpose, I have only to apologize for giving you this trouble. But If on the contrary you wish it, to be strengthened by the Exertions, & Cooperation of the country, I beg to offer my services, in any way your Lordship thinks they can be employed with Effect. Which is all I should presume to state, if it were not for the Local Circumstances, in which I happen to be placed, and in which the 1st Devon Militia is likely from your application to remain. I am led to the following Statement, from a conviction That the unheard of Exertions of the Enemy are only to be counteracted by exertions of a similar nature.
I therefore would propose to your Lordship, to establish Depots of Arms for several Thousand Men, ready to be delivered to such as would engage to take them, under the direction of the Neighbouring Gentry, Clergy, & Yeomanry properly authorized. Which should put Government to no other expence than the Arms, until the Men were actually called on, to use them to repel Invasion: to appoint to every one his station, & employment, whether that of harassing the Enemy, guarding Prisoners, driving Cattle &ca., breaking up Roads, or any other purpose Your Lordship might point out.
In short If I may be allowed the expression, to organize the whole Mass of the Coast from the Dart to the Plym; commonly called the South Hams; and to hold it in readiness to obey any orders your Lordship may issue, between the former place and the Thames. If your Lordship wishes such a Plan to take place, I shall be ready [ to ] give my assistance to a [ sic ] in any way I can, to anyone whom Geoverment [ sic ] chuses to authorize to carry it into effect. If it is thought necessary I should undertake any part of it myself, I am equally ready to do it, provided no possible Reward or Emolument of any sort, could possibly accrue to Myself.
If I am called on to execute any part, I should propose to your Lordship to permit the Regiment I command, or any part of it you could Spare to give that assistance, & Support to the Whole, which might be necessary to inspire confidence in the People, to direct their Movements with some kind of Regularity, as well as provide for their Wants &ca in a Military View. And also that we should have allotted to us the Three Troops of Provisional Cavalry which belong to this Neighbourhood. The Gentlemen who are destined to Command Them are desirous of it, and the Advantages of having them with us, arising from their Characters, & Connections with the People, and with Myself, as well as their perfect knowledge of the country would be Incalculable.
To enter into Minute Details of such a Plan would only be wasting your Lordship's Time. For as serving the Country is the only Object I have in view;They might be regulated in any way your Lordship approves, as the only Condition, I have to offer is that every one, Myself excepted, should if called out be provided for according to their Stations, during the Time they were in Actual Service in the Field, or should be wounded; in the same manner, as his Majesty's Forces are. And that the Families of the Privates should be subsisted while the Men are in Actual Service.
Kitley January 30th 1798" [61]
Bastard also sent a copy of this letter to Lord Fortescue, who forwarded it to Henry Dundas (secretary of war, 1794-1801.)
Dundas replied to the Lord Lieutenant :
" Parliament Street
10 March 1798
My Lord.
I have received the honor of your Lordship's Letter of the 7th instant inclosing a Copy of one from Lieut:Col.Bastard to Lord George Lennox - It appears to me that the ideas suggested in Col. Bastard's Letter are entitled to serious attention. Viewing then in that light, I cannot help Expressing to your Lordship my earnest wish, that as soon as it may suit your Lordship's convenience, the proper steps may be taken for bringing them under the consideration of the Deputy Lieutenants and Magistrates of the County of Devon, when I shall be glad to receive from Your Lordship a detailed Report of the Suggestions that may occur to them on Col .Bastard's Proposal, and their Opinion with respect to the most effectual mode of carrying it into execution, either in its present Shape, or with such amendments and alterations as it may appear to them to require." [62]
Fortescue apparently considered the plan to be too vague to be discussed in its present shape, and Dundas' reply showed that the administration had eventually got round to formulating a general plan, not intending to depend upon ad hoc arrangements.
"ParIt. Street
16 March
My Lord,
I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 13th instant, stating the reasons why it appears to you to be inexpedient to convene the Magistrates and Deputy Lieutenants of the County of Devon without being enabled to lay before them some more distinct and specific Plan than is contained in Mr .Bastard's letter....I shall have soon to signify to your Lordship His Majesty's commands respecting a plan proposed to be executed in the Maritime Counties for the defence of the Kingdom against Invasion." [63]
This appeared in the form of a lengthy government circular dated April 6 1798. This dealt with recruitment, organisation, pay, and training : the preparation of lists of those willing to serve as pioneers for road breaking, etc. Local associations such as that advocated by Admiral Ourry were to be encouraged, and routes for the evacuation of live and dead stock, women and children were to be planned so as not to conflict with military movements. Depots for the evacuees and the stock were to be arranged, together with arrangements for supplying the army. [64]
Bastard was not pleased with the rejection of his plan, and clearly felt little confidence in the official arrangements. On April 12 he wrote to a friend in Dundas' office: the letter shows that all was not well in Devonshire.
"Dear Hanley
I inclose you as you desire a copy of my letter to Lord George Lennox, who as well as General Simcoe pressed the Adoption of it in the Strongest Manner, as the best mode of giving security to Plymouth. Lord George also desired an early Determination on it, as He had prevailed on me to remain...at Plymouth for the purpose of carrying it into immediate Execution. After waiting Six weeks, without any notice being taken of it, I came to Town and about the last week in March was informed by Lord Fortescue in Bond St. that Mr.Dundass, had the Day before, notified to Him that as a General Plan was in agitation, no particular Plans of Defence would be considered. You will observe at the Time I wrote that Letter, not only the Gentlemen & Yeomanry had been applied to by me, but also the Corporation of Dartmouth and smaller Towns, who all then determined to carry it into effect. Of course I was obliged to communicate to Them Mr Dundass answer. What the views of that neighbourhood are now, I cannot answer for. I know in Parts of Devonshire some disagreeable things have happened and I am sure that the Manner in which things have been conducted as to Defence &ca have by no means added to the security of the country. I am perfectly ready to explain myself, if your Friend wishes it. For I cannot help feeling it, of serious consequence. And I cannot abstain from giving my opinion now on the merit of arming &ca proposed to be adopted viz : That you may perhap, but of that even I am not sure, have a Magnificent return on Paper but one that cannot be effective in Service. I say this from the Experience I had personally in carrying into Effect something Similar to the Plan now Proposed, last War. When we actually were called into Active Service, and Marched forty Miles from our own Homes with the French Prisoners. I mention this circumstance only to show you I do not speak at Random on the Subject.
Yours &ca
J.P.Bastard.
April 12th 1798" [65]
Arrangements for defence now went ahead and an official circular of May 9 1798 reported that 3779 muskets were available for the volunteer corps in Devon. [66]
Napoleon sailed for Egypt on May 19, but the immediate threat was not considered to have abated for some months.
In July Lt.General Simcoe, commanding at Exeter, sent in a return of the volunteers: "Persons who have voluntarily returned themselves as willing to serve in the Classes as specified....for such Military Purposes as may be necessary in case of an Actual Invasion of Britain, or of an Insurrection therein -."
The totals were 934 Cavalry, 17666 Infantry, 7977 Pioneers. The areas showing the largest returns were
|
Cavalry |
Infantry |
Pioneers |
|
|
Roborough |
86 |
2629 |
419 |
|
West Budleigh |
3 |
1446 |
944 |
|
Tiverton |
3 |
975 |
861 |
|
Exeter |
35 |
916 |
246 |
|
East Budleigh |
64 |
857 |
400 |
During 1799 the Lord Lieutenant circulated fresh instructions for the action to be taken in the event of invasion. The countryside, within fifteen miles of the coast, was to be "driven" so as to leave nothing for the enemy.
This was well organised. Two men from each parish were to be appointed as guides for leading the animals, etc. by non-strategic roads: each was to have a good horse, a light fowling-piece with ammunition, a hatchet or billhook and a sharp-pointed knife, and a blanket. The guides were to be officered and paid as Yeomanry and were to assemble at the local army headquarters. Pioneers, who were to repair communications for the army or destroy them before the enemy, were not to be armed, but organised in bodies of at least 25, and were to be equipped with six pickaxes, nine spades or shovels, four billhooks and six felling axes for every 25 men. They were to remain in their parishes for local service, unless sent elsewhere to erect fortifications, and were to be paid for at local labour rates, with the leader of a gang of 25 receiving 3 shillings per day, and a captain of 50 5 shillings.
Printed forms were to be issued to parish authorities for giving and recording the following information : Owners of waggons for removing the sick and infirm were to provide two days provisions for the horses and the driver, shoes and nails for the horses, tools to breach hedges if necessary. To be filled in were the names of the driver, the passengers, the pick-up point, and the name of the Conductor. ( Conductors had the charge of up to ten wagons, and were to move them by the designated routes.) Conductors of stock were to take provisions, a blanket, and hedge-breaking tools, and were to take the route given by the Superintendent of the parish. Owners of stock were to fill in the name of the driver, the place to join the Conductor, and the name of the Conductor, Persons in charge of dead stock were to remain in the parish and await orders, but in an emergency if the enemy approached they were to destroy corn, hay, cattle, horses and vehicles which had not been moved j the owners were to be compensated if co-operative. [68]
The fortifications completed
Napoleon massed another invasion army in the summer of 1801. This was to be a more seriously prepared attempt: in March he wrote to the Minister of Marine for information about the length of time it would take to assemble a hundred gunboats at Boulogne, and further information about the craft available. On March 13 he instituted the organisation of these boats into a flotilla whose crews were always to be on board and ready. Mercer responded by putting forward suggestions for further work on the defences. The Secretary of the Board replied on May 14th "I have received and submitted to the Lieut General and Board Your Letter of the 10th Instant, reporting Your Opinion upon the Defences of the Berry Head and of what is wanting, particularly to the Line embracing the Berry Head, and the Redoubt No.1 for Security and better Defence: and I am directed to desire you will proceed to carry into Effect the several Services which you represent to be necessary for completing the Works described in your Letter into a state of Defence taking care not to exceed your Estimate of the Expence of such Services which you state to be £580." [69]
Lt.General John Simcoe had been appointed to command the Western District on January 9 1801. He wrote to the Commander in Chief (the Duke of York) on July 28 urging the completion of the defences:
"I am so forcibly impressed with the propriety and necessity of establishing the Fortresses of Pendennis and Berry Head without delay that, I trust Your Royal Highness will permit me to state to You the reasons that lead to this opinion....Berry-Head has much of the quality of Pendennis ; as in some measure protecting the great commercial and Naval Anchorage of Torbay, and secondary to Plymouth (the great Arsenal of the West of England) may be made the Arsenal of Devonshire - The present and future situation of this Country, in my most humble opinion, calls for the proper completion of the Fortress of Berry-Head, and the occupation of Pendennis in the most judicious manner." [70]
The Duke of York concurred with Simcoe on this matter, as is shown by the preservation of a letter written from the Horse Guards on August 13 by the military secretary, Col. Brownrigg to Lt.Col.Hadden, secretary to the Master General of the Ordnance, telling him on the Commander in Chief's orders to lay Simcoe's proposals, which were now set out in book form, before the Master General.[71] This document does not appear to have survived, but a letter of October 7 from Simcoe to Lt.General Morse, the acting Chief Engineer (who the next year was to be appointed the first Inspector-General of Fortifications) shows that it included plans for rendering the fort useless to the enemy should it have to be abandoned : "In regard to Berry Head in the copy of your letter which I have received, the Word Flank is mistaken for Tank. It was the Tank, should the place be dismantled, that would be necessarily destroyed, as the distance from Water would preclude any Enemy from maintaining themselves in the works of Bury [ sic ] Head, unless by means of the Tank or Cistern." [72]
Men of the 1st Devonshire Militia returned to Berry Head the next month, an order of November 21 1801 from the Plymouth Dock Barracks reading : "A Detachment Consisting of Capt 1 Sub 2 S 4 D 2 R & File 100 from the E Devon Militia will be in readiness to March to Berry Head on Tuesday Morning next agreeable to a Route that will be given them. This Detachmt will furnish a Guard to the Naval Hospital at Penton Consisting of Sub 1 S 2 D 1 & R & File 40." They marched on the 24th,, but their period of duty at the Naval Hospital was extremely brief : an order of the 26th. reads "The Guard at the Naval Hospital at Painton to be relieved by a Detachmt. of Marines from H.M.Fleet.
M.Genl England [the Commander of the Plymouth Garrison] will be pleased to make any Alterations in the Numbers detached from Plymo Garrison to Berry Head as He shall think Proper.
The Garrison at Berry Head & the Dragoons at Modbury & Totness are to Report unto M.Genl.England untill further orders." [73]